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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  This paper examines whether the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) affects 
Supreme Court decision-making. The FAE was first analyzed in 1977 by the social 
psychologist Lee Ross, who argued that individuals have a tendency to attribute the root 
causes of unfavorable actions to the situations of those whom they liked, but to the 
dispositions of those whom they dislike. Psychological analysis of political elites has 
been popular for some time. However, the FAE has been under-examined in political 
science literature. This is the first paper to attempt to examine the FAE’s potential 
presence and effect in Supreme Court decision-making. Identifying how and why justices 
make decisions is important not just for political scientists—who are obviously intrigued 
by the nature of elite decision-making and the factors that drive it—but also for wider 
applications of good governance. Understanding the factors justices consider when 
issuing decisions can help society correct and avoid unjust biases, and this study and 
others like it may help broaden our understanding of these problems. This paper aims to 
further that understanding by identifying the frequency of situationalist and 
dispositionalist words in transcripts of Supreme Court decisions from the start of the 
Rehnquist court to present (1987-2012). I analyze a number of variables predicting the 
frequency of the words, in order to assess whether conscious and/or subconscious drivers 
can account for the FAE’s presence. I predict that: the FAE is not as prevalent when there 
is more consensus on the Court; majority opinions are least prone and dissenting opinions 
are most prone to the FAE; dispositional references are used more often by conservative 
justices and that situational references are utilized more often by liberal justices; the FAE 
is more prevalent when the issue of law before the Court deals directly with human 
parties; cases with less complex language will have greater use of the FAE; the FAE is 
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more prevalent as the Court’s term lengthens; and that the Chief Justice does not impact 
the prevalence of the FAE. I elaborate upon the rationale for these predictions in the 
following chapters.*  
                                                
* There are many people I would like to thank for their guidance and support throughout 
the process of writing this paper. Professor Michael Parkin, my First Reader, deserves 
tremendous credit and gratitude for his guidance and steadfast patience as I accosted him 
numerous times in his office asking for help with my regression work. Professor Ronald 
Kahn, my Second Reader, has been a profound inspiration for my desire to study the 
Supreme Court and for furthering my understanding of its decision-making processes. 
Professor Kristina Mani, the Honors Seminar leader, created a forum of discussion and 
mutual support amongst the Honors cohort from which all students benefitted immensely. 
Professor Justin Wedeking at the University of Kentucky provided excellent assistance in 
the early stages of my project. My housemate, Jeremy Reynolds, also deserves my thanks 
for his tolerance of the enormous mess that was created in our living room over the final 
month of this project as I piled books up on almost every available surface. Finally, I 
would like to thank my wonderful mother, Dr. Amy Parish, for providing excellent 
research guidance, emotional support, and editorial evisceration as I prepared this paper. I 
would not be where I am today without her help.  
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Chapter 2: Theory 
  This chapter explores the reasons why the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) 
might be present in Supreme Court opinions. Both unconscious and conscious decisions 
drive the occurrence of the FAE to varying degrees and different types of opinions may 
be more or less vulnerable to the FAE. For instance, assuming, arguendo, that the results 
suggest the FAE primarily occurs in majority opinions, a theoretical analysis might lead 
to the conclusion that the FAE is strategic. Since it is mostly employed in the context of a 
“successful” opinion, the FAE may be utilized in order to ensure a positive result or to 
develop the logic of successful opinions. Conversely, if the FAE is mostly identified in 
dissenting opinions written by an individual justice, two explanations are worthy of 
exploration. One theory is strategic in nature: perhaps the FAE is an avenue for the 
realization of a justice’s goals. Another theory is that unconscious biases, perhaps 
activated by collegial rejection of the author’s opinion, have influenced part of the 
opinion such that it contains an FAE reference. This chapter reviews a number of 
approaches that have been utilized by other scholars to identify whether the presence of 
the FAE can be explained by a variety of strategic considerations, as well as unconscious 
biases.  
  As reviewed in the introduction, the FAE is the tendency to attribute the root 
cause of an action to the situations of people we like, but to the dispositions of people we 
dislike (Houghton 2009, 119). Everyone is vulnerable to this phenomena. For instance, 
when I’m watching my beloved Chelsea Football Club play, I attribute my team’s fouls 
to the other team’s dirty play. Hence I blame the situation of my team’s players. At the 
same time I will readily use a litany of profanity to describe the moral dispositions of the 
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opposing team’s players. David Patrick Houghton provides a more elegant explanation of 
such attributions, 
When we are explaining our own actions, we very often use 
situational attributions, and in fact we often overestimate 
the extent to which our actions are the result of the 
situation. On the other hand, when asked to explain why 
someone else acted as they did, we often make the opposite 
kind of mistake: we underestimate the extent to which the 
situation matters. (Ibid. 119) 
  It is easy to identify instances in which the FAE appears in Supreme Court 
decisions. Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) is illustrative. The case involves the double-murder of 
a reverend and his wife and the double-attempted murder of their children after Glen 
Burton Ake broke into their Oklahoma home and robbed them at gunpoint with an 
accomplice. At the trial, the prosecution presented testimony from a psychiatrist who 
testified that Ake was sane and fit to stand trial. Ake was denied a psychiatrist for his 
defense (he was indigent) and he appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, arguing 
that a due process violation had occurred. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the 
opinion of the Court. As Lawrence S. Wrightsman reviews in The Psychology of the 
Supreme Court,  “Nothing in [the majority opinion] suggests the possibility that Ake was 
faking or malingering. We are led to believe that his symptoms are genuine, and the 
opinion cites the diagnosis, prior to medication, of Ake as a paranoid schizophrenic 
person” (Wrightsman 2006, 117). Justice Rehnquist, in contrast, focuses on different 
facets of the case in his dissent: “[the dissent] gave a description of the actual crime; he 
named the victims, thus personalizing them; and [the dissent] used emotion-laden terms 
such as ‘brutal murders’ and ‘month-long crime spree’” (Ibid. 118). Justice Marshall, in 
his majority opinion, focused almost exclusively on the situational aspects of Ake’s trial: 
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he was not provided with adequate legal council, he was clearly psychologically unstable, 
and he was not on medication to treat his paranoid schizophrenia. Justice Rehnquist, 
instead, focused on Ake’s dispositional aspects: that Ake managed to provide a coherent 
statement when he was booked and that he had told a cellmate he planned to “play crazy” 
(that testimony was not presented to the jury) (Ibid. 119). These factors, presented on 
their face, would suggest that Ake was a pathological criminal who enjoyed serial 
murders and rape. The contrast between the opinions—and their focus on dispositions 
and situations—provide an archetypical example of the way the FAE is employed in 
decisions.  
  Ziva Kunda, a social psychologist from the University of Waterloo in Canada, 
provides a framework that might explain the differences in the Ake opinions: motivated 
reasoning. She argues that individuals (including justices) “rely in [sic] cognitive 
processes and representations to arrive at their desired conclusions, but motivation plays 
a role in determining which of these will be used on a given occasion” (Kunda 1990, 
480). Justice Marshall was motivated to protect the rights of a defendant—even if he 
obviously didn’t endorse the defendant’s behavior—and selectively invoked the evidence 
that, in his mind, would best defend that position (namely, situational factors surrounding 
Ake’s behavior). Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, had a history of voting against 
Miranda rights and other expansions of due process, and he invoked dispositional 
evidence that, in his mind, would support his “desired conclusion” (Wrightsman 2006, 
119-120; Kunda 1990, 483). 
  The argument that individuals rely on such cognitive processes and 
representations in their decision-making implies that the decision to include FAE 
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language is subconscious. The FAE is, as its name suggests, an error. Judges presumably 
want to avoid errors in their judgments. Commentators might be tempted to blame inter-
judicial politics and strategic games, but at the end of the day there are still nine 
individuals on the bench who have undergone a serious vetting and confirmation process 
(although sometimes, admittedly, justices are not chosen for the correct reasons†). One 
hopes that justices endeavor to effect justice, not create injustice, and that they 
acknowledge that their own personal biases might lead to the wrong decisions if not 
checked. As Justice Rehnquist proclaimed during his confirmation hearings, “My 
fundamental commitment, if I am confirmed, will be to totally disregard my own 
personal beliefs” (Wrightsman 2006, 109). Of course, it is also possible that such 
statements are for show, but even if that were the case, obvious utilization of the FAE 
would come at a cost—embarrassment from the criticism of fellow justices for using non-
legal theory in decisions—with presumably little gain.   
  If judges are indeed committing the FAE unconsciously, one can surmise that 
justices are simply human. As Wrightsman observes,  
Judges are human—that statement is obvious. […] But 
what does it mean to be human? It means to have biases but 
sometimes to be able to overcome those biases. It also 
                                                
† Wrightsman presents several examples: Shay Minton simply walked up to President 
Truman and asked him for the nomination, to which the president replied “Shay, I’ll do 
just that.” President George H.W. Bush, when introducing his nomination of Clarence 
Thomas, chose to defend his choice by saying “[Thomas] is the best person for the 
position… the fact that he is Black and a minority has nothing to do with this.” William 
Rehnquist was President Nixon’s eighth choice for the Supreme Court—he had formerly 
described him as “the guy dressed like a clown.” Finally, Wrightsman supplies the 
memorable anecdote of James McReynolds’ nomination by Woodrow Wilson, with 
Wilson nominating McReynolds because “as Wilson’s attorney general, McReynolds had 
been obstinate, opinionated, and unable to work with the president and the rest of the 
Cabinet” (Wrightsman, 29-30).  
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means to make mistakes, on occasion. […] To be human 
also means to be concerned with one’s own self-interests 
but also concerned with the reactions of others to one’s 
choices, and even, at times, concerned with the attainment 
of higher goals. (Wrightsman 2006, 22-23). 
  It is well documented that humans are exceptionally bad at being rational in their 
decision-making. As Jonathan Haidt observes in his book The Righteous Mind: Why good 
People Are Divided by Politics and Religion, for humans “intuitions come first, strategic 
reasoning second” (Haidt 2013, xxv). He asserts that there are two types of thought 
processes: System I thought and System II thought.‡  System I thought processes are 
instant and represent our intuition, while System II thought governs our rationality (Ibid. 
52). System I processes control approximately 99% of a person’s actions, and only once 
an action has been determined by our intuition do we rationalize it. However, we aren’t 
very good at rationalizing our instincts. Haidt offers an example: two siblings, after a 
night of partying, decide that it would be fun to engage in sexual intercourse. There is no 
danger of a pregnancy resulting from the action, and no one other than the siblings finds 
out about the action. It is simply a night that they enjoyed together. After telling people of 
this story, Haidt would ask for a reaction. Overwhelmingly, people had a problem with 
the actions of the siblings. Whenever they presented a reason (a rationalization of their 
instinct), Haidt would present a compelling counter-argument that invalidated their 
rationalization. Eventually, people were left morally dumbfounded: they could not 
explain why they had a problem with this incestuous action. Nonetheless, people 
maintained their initial belief that the action was wrong (Ibid. 29).  
                                                
‡ He terms System I thought as an “elephant” and System II thought as a “rider.” 
However, I have decided to stick to actual psychological terminology for this paper, 
rather than New York Times Bestseller pop-psychology lingo.  
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  System I thought is activated by affective priming: the presentation of certain 
stimuli to impact instinctual reactions. Lodge and Taber devote a significant portion of 
their book The Rationalizing Voter to exploring how affective priming can influence our 
political decision-making. Their central thesis is that decisions are made within 100 
milliseconds of brain activation, and that only then do our brains begin to work to justify 
the decision. One of their most compelling studies in affective priming is their study of 
the impact of physical attractiveness on character assessment (Lodge and Taber 2013, 
12). For instance, just by looking at pictures of political candidates, people can predict 
with 68% accuracy the outcome of the election because they instinctively choose the 
more attractive candidate, both in the photo selection and in the voting booth. Lodge and 
Taber hypothesize that people are affect-primed by the attractiveness of a candidate to 
instinctively like them, and only then do they try to justify why. Such attractive priming 
isn’t even limited to the voting booth: Zebrowitz and McDonald found that attractive 
people were generally treated less harshly in sentencing hearings by judges than 
unattractive people (1991, 610).  
  Humans are lazy in their attempts to rationalize: they react instinctively to a 
stimulus, and then attempt to explain that reaction with whatever information is readily 
available. The utilization of situational and dispositional references to explain actions can 
be similarly activated: we have an instinctual reaction to a person, and then we rationalize 
that reaction by either focusing on positive situational attributes or negative dispositional 
attributes.   
  There is, however, another explanation for the FAE’s presence: it might be 
strategically employed. Perhaps justices are at least somewhat aware of the FAE’s 
 10 
presence in their decision and hope to gain some benefit from its use in a decision. This 
theory is not mutually exclusive with the subconscious-driver theory that is reviewed in 
the previous pages. It is entirely possible that both conscious and subconscious 
behavioral traits are driving the FAE’s presence. To explore the possibility of strategic 
consideration further, an analysis of several models of judicial decision-making is 
required. These models explore the considerations justices employ and their motivations 
for the strategic choices that appear in their official Court opinions. 
  Three main models of judicial decision-making predominate in the literature: the 
Legal Model; the Attitudinal Model; and the Rational Choice Model. All three models 
suggest that justices have some goals in mind when they make decisions, but differ in 
their perceptions of judicial motivation.  
  The Legal Model emerged from the normative traditions of political science that 
dominated the field in the middle of the twentieth century (Malzman et al. 2000, 10). 
According to Segal and Spaeth, the Legal Model argues that the facts of a case are 
interpreted on face legal value, and justices construct their jurisprudence “in light of the 
plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the framers, and/or 
precedent” (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 48). If this model sounds like a highly normative 
version of Originalism, that’s because it is: Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist are its main proponents (Wrightsman 2006, 111). The Legal Model argues that 
decisions must be interpreted based on at least one of the aforementioned criteria. One 
touchstone is strict framer intent, the application of which can be seen in Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in the case of Maryland v. Craig (1990), which upheld legislation compelling 
sexually abused children to testify (albeit via intercom), as he believed the Confrontation 
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Clause of the Constitution did not permit an exception under any circumstances, even to 
allow children to avoid confrontation with their attackers. Another litmus test for 
decision-making is a literal reading of the text of the Constitution, as illustrated by Justice 
Scalia’s argument that the death penalty is permissible because the Constitution states 
“no person shall be… deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” 
(emphasis added), meaning that, as long as due process is present, a person may be 
deprived of those rights. The final metric for decision-making in the Legal Model is 
adherence to stare decisis: in comparing current cases with similar past cases, justices 
might be able to draw connections that are constitutionally permissible (Wrightsman 
2006, 112). In sum, according to the Legal Model, all other avenues of Constitutional 
interpretation are invalid.  
  The Legal Model approach also excludes analysis of the situations and 
dispositions of parties in a case. The esteemed Justice Felix Frankfurter advanced this 
point in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), when he observed 
that “It can never be emphasized too much that one’s own opinion about the wisdom or 
evil of a law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one’s duty on the bench” 
(Wrightsman 2006, 114). Lawrence Baum of Ohio State University suggests that 
Frankfurter’s advice is not universally adopted: when cases are not clear-cut, justices 
“justify whatever decision best accords with their policy views” (Baum 1997, 66). Legal 
Modelers face an additional quandary: how can a decision adhere to at least one of the 
three central tenants of the model if the correct answer in a case is not inherently 
obvious? Justice Robert Jackson concedes this point: “We are not final because we are 
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infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final” (Schwartz 1996, x). Alan Barth 
expresses a similar sentiment: 
Judicial judging is not encompassed by general expressions 
of principle and theory. Intuition, personal experience, 
surges of human sympathy are also influences upon 
decision [sic]. And, in the end, judges, like other human 
beings, are certain to be swayed by what they think, and 
feel, is right. The Supreme Court may be a court of law, but 
it is a court of justice, too. For justice must be the end of 
law. And law is but a reflection of ethical values. (Barth 
1974, 192). 
To completely embroider the point that the FAE is incompatible in a Legal Model Court, 
we return to the subconscious-driver hypothesis. As Chief Justice Hughes once observed 
to Justice Douglas, “You must remember one thing. At the constitutional level where we 
work, ninety percent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the 
reasons for supporting our predilections” (Douglas 1980, 8). The evidence would suggest 
that the Legal Model cannot accommodate nor tacitly condone the presence of the FAE, 
and therefore this theory cannot explain its presence.  
  Many political scientists use another model to analyze Court behavior: the 
Attitudinal Model. The model was formalized and promulgated by Segal and Spaeth in 
their book The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. The authors argue 
that Court decisions reflect interpretation of facts “in light of the ideological attitudes and 
values of the justices” (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 32). The Attitudinal Model relies on 
several assumptions. First, attitudes have utilitarian function: in this case, justices develop 
positive attitudes toward aspects of the case that support their ideological opinion. 
Second, attitudes are “ego-defensive”; that is, attitudes shield their owner from certain 
realities of the world that would upset the justice and instead allow the justice to only 
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interpret certain facts—thereby leaving him or her blissfully ignorant of the realities of 
their surroundings. This assertion is not far fetched: as Lodge and Taber observe, humans 
employ extremely selective interpretations of the world, and we usually only absorb 
about 1/250,000 of what is going on around us at any given time (Lodge and Taber 2013, 
1). The third assumption is that attitudes provide schema within which individuals can 
organize copious amounts of information. As Wrightsman observes, some attorneys—
e.g. Professor Laurence Tribe—can appear upwards of 30 times at the Supreme Court 
over the course of their career. The prior performances of that attorney impact the 
attitudes and opinions of justices, regardless of the specifics in the pending case 
(Wrightsman 2006, 122). A final assumption is that individuals gain satisfaction through 
expressing their attitudes. Again, the ubiquitous Justice Scalia illustrates this point: “To 
be able to write an opinion solely for oneself, without the need to accommodate… the 
more-or-less differing views of one’s colleagues… is indeed an unparalleled pleasure” 
(Ibid. 103, 121-123).  
  Many studies support these assumptions and the Attitudinal Model in general. For 
instance, Segal and Cover content-analyzed newspaper editorials of all justices from 
Warren to Kennedy, and the justices were ranked based on their ideological score. The 
authors then regressed the results against the justices’ votes on civil liberties cases and 
found a high degree of relationship between being a liberal justice and voting for an 
expansion of civil liberties (Segal and Cover 1989, 561-562).  
  On the face of it, the Attitudinal Model seemingly explains the presence of the 
FAE by arguing that decisions are driven by ideology. This is particularly supported by 
George Lakoff’s work in Moral Politics. Lakoff contends that liberals and conservatives 
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possess fundamentally different moral conceptions of the world. Conservatives adopt a 
“strict father” model of morality. For them the world is a dangerous place where survival 
can only be guaranteed through self-discipline, which is built through reward and 
punishment. Their moral priorities include: moral strength; order; wholeness; integrity; 
and self-interest (Lakoff 2002, 70). Conversely, liberals have a “nurturant parent” model 
of morality. They believe that empathy, nurturance, happiness, fairness, and personal 
growth are key for a healthy society, and that self-fulfillment can be achieved through 
nurturance. Their moral priorities reflect this belief (Ibid. 109). There is an intuitive 
obviousness that links both moral systems to the FAE. Liberals, with their focus on 
fairness and empathy, are likely more prone to focus on situational aspects of behavior, 
while conservatives, with their emphasis on moral purity and order, are likely to focus on 
dispositional aspects of behavior. If we accept the Attitudinal Model’s presumption that 
ideology drives decision-making, then judicial ideology probably manifests itself in the 
FAE: conservative justices will likely utilize dispositional references to explain the 
actions of people they dislike, while liberal justices will look for situational excuses for 
those whom they favor. That’s not to say that a liberal justice can’t reference the 
disposition of the disfavored party or a conservative justice can’t speak to the situation of 
the favored party; it’s just more likely that the inclinations will follow a predictable 
pattern.§ 
  There are, however, two problems with the Attitudinal Model. Firstly, the 
Attitudinal Model is heavily criticized on methodological grounds. Maltzman, Spriggs II, 
                                                
§ It also seems likely that the content of dispositional references will shift depending on 
judicial ideology: conservatives will likely focus on issues of purity and moral 
corruption, while liberals will focus on issues of inequitable treatment. I cannot test this 
theory in the scope of the current work, though it might be worth exploring in the future.  
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and Wahlbeck maintain in Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game that 
experiments which seek to support the Attitudinal Model have a major advantage 
compared to those that would seek to support alternative models: the data available to 
prove the saliency of the Attitudinal Model is readily available. The attitudinal scholar 
must only score the ideology of a justice and regress it against the outcome of a case 
(Maltzman et al. 2000, 6). Wrightsman sums up the issues:  
The attitudinal advocates, by focusing on justices’ votes as 
their dependent variable, have taken on an ambitious 
assignment. It is true that justices’ votes are observable and 
final, hence their determination is important to the justice, 
as well as to the country. But votes are behavior, and any 
complex behavior has many causes, many of them 
extending beyond attitudes, values, and ideology. Second, 
the Attitudinal Model has been criticized for limiting itself 
to the search for determination of voting behavior [instead 
of focusing on other topics, such as cert decisions, the 
influence on past attitudinal decisions on present ones, and 
other strategic considerations that justices make]. 
(Wrightsman 2006, 131). 
Despite this methodological problem, the Attitudinal Model can still explain the presence 
of the FAE. Previous research suggests that ideology might be a factor in the utilization 
(not just the content) of the FAE. In the 1980s, Philip Tetlock of the University of 
Pennsylvania conducted a series of studies on the “conceptual complexity” of Supreme 
Court decisions. Tetlock and his colleagues describe conceptual complexity as the 
differentiation of environmental interpretation that individuals undertake: 
Individuals at the simple end of the complexity continuum 
tend to rely on rigid, one-dimensional, evaluative rules in 
interpreting events, and to make decisions on the basis of 
only a few salient items of information. Individuals at the 
complex end of the continuum tend to interpret events in 
multidimensional terms and to integrate a variety of 
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evidence in arriving at decisions. (Tetlock et al. 1985, 
1228). 
As Wrightsman observes, emotionally-laden language is often used in the presentation of 
a dissenting opinion (e.g. italics, “verb modifiers,” and louder punctuation) (Wrightsman 
2006, 100). It seems reasonable to conclude that FAE is more likely to arise in opinions 
dictated by emotion rather than by legal logic. Tetlock et al. would likely agree with this 
perspective, as it aligns well with two of their observations about conceptual complexity: 
minority opinions are less complex than majority opinions, and ideology underlies 
conceptual complexity. Majority opinions are a cooperative effort amongst at least five 
(usually) highly intelligent justices (this is elaborated further in this paper’s section on the 
Rational Choice Model). Majority decisions tend to be more cognitively complex because 
of the complexity that is required to integrate all of their competing policy desires. 
Conversely, minority opinions do not require cognitive complexity and have “the 
rhetorical freedom to take strong, unqualified stands in opposition to the majority” 
(Tetlock et al. 1985, 1235). On the other hand, dissents are costly to construct, both in 
terms of time and political capital on the Court, and they usually are constructed only 
when a justice feels that the decision is an injustice.  
  Tetlock’s conclusion that political ideology drives conceptual complexity is 
derived from his observation that conservative arguments in Supreme Court opinions 
generally rest on less complex notions of the world and are more consistent in their 
invocation of absolutist language than moderate or liberal arguments (Ibid. 1227). 
Wrightsman opines, however, that Tetlock’s analysis of Supreme Court decisions was 
drawn primarily from a period when majority opinions were written by liberal justices. 
Gruenfeld’s 1995 work likewise reveals a major methodological flaw in Tetlock’s work: 
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minority opinions are generally lacking in complexity, regardless of the ideology of the 
author (Wrightsman 2006, 106). Gruenfeld drew a different sample of Supreme Court 
cases from those that Tetlock et al. relied upon and found that, while dissenting opinions 
did feature lower levels of conceptual complexity, conceptual complexity was not 
statistically different amongst liberal and conservative justices when they were in the 
minority of the Court (Gruenfeld 1995, 11). Therefore, cognitive complexity can be 
viewed as one potential driver of the FAE in opinions, since lower cognitive complexity 
is associated with more emotional language choice, without the danger of collinearity 
with ideology. While it is almost impossible to measure cognitive complexity without a 
brain scan, we can look at language complexity as a close proxy (which is exactly what 
this paper does; see “Chapter 3: Methodology, Predictions, and Summary Statistics”).  
  Emotional intensity in opinions is likely also determined by the case in front of 
the Court. Martin and Quinn argue that certain areas of law invoke more emotional 
responses from some justices than others (2007, 367). Justice Brennan, for instance, was 
passionate in his protection of Miranda rights, while Justice Rehnquist concerned himself 
with issues of federalism. Generally, cases involving “human” subjects elicit more 
emotional responses, and the Court is more likely to listen to public perception on such 
issues (Fleming and Wood 1997, 490). It seems fair to surmise that such human cases 
will elucidate more FAE references than cases dealing with non-human parties.  
  The Attitudinal Model provides some insight into drivers of the FAE despite its 
methodological shortcomings. It does point to issues of ideology and language/cognitive 
complexity as drivers of the FAE. However, the Attitudinal Model falls short of a full 
explanation of judicial decision-making, as there is more to the process than mere 
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ideology. There are other models of judicial decision-making that offer additional 
theories that might explain the presence of the FAE.  
 The third popular model of judicial decision-making is the Rational Choice 
Model. The model seeks to expand beyond the sole analysis of Supreme Court votes and 
instead focuses on other strategic considerations. As Wrightsman reports, the model 
assumes that justices “pursue multiple goals; …act in ways that maximize their goals, and 
the institutions within which they operate sometimes affect their goals. Thus, sometimes 
they must do things that fail, in the short run, to achieve goals” (Wrightsman 2006, 131-
132). Maltzman et al. are major proponents of this theory, and their book, Crafting Law 
on the Supreme Court: the Collegial Game is often referenced as the cornerstone of the 
Rational Choice Model. Their assessment is similar to Wrightsman’s, however, they 
explicitly emphasize the role of institutionalism in the model: 
Institutions… provide the structure within which decision 
making occurs and thereby affect the choices that can be 
made. […] Instead of deterministically responding to 
psychological or sociological forces beyond their control, 
rational actors understand that they face a number of 
constraints imposed by the actions of other political actors 
and by the institutional context in which they act. Justices 
as strategic actors must take into consideration those 
constraints as they attempt to introduce their policy 
preferences into law. (Maltzman et al. 2000, 13).  
The authors also explain that the institutional constraints within which justices operate 
can be formal or informal. Formal rules are intransigent: for instance, the separation of 
powers delineated in the Constitution would prevent a justice from declaring war on 
another nation. Informal rules are generally procedures and cultural norms; for instance: 
opinion assignments originate from the most senior justice in the majority; the majority 
opinion is circulated amongst the justices during the writing process; and a plurality 
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opinion is not actually binding unless interpreted in the most narrow of contexts (Ibid. 
14). Walter Murphy, the founder of judicial rational choice analysis, recognizes that this 
creates a major constraint on judicial decision-making: justices cannot merely vote their 
policy preferences. A majority opinion requires five votes, and from those five votes a 
final, singular opinion has to be reached. Justices will utilize a “mixture of appeals, 
threats, and offers to compromise” in order to have as much of their policy preferences 
represented in the opinion as possible (Murphy 1964, 42). Lawrence Baum of Ohio State 
University expands on this idea arguing that “Judges who vote strategically take into 
account the effects of their choices on collective results when they vote on outcomes and 
write or support opinions… because of this motivation, the positions they take may differ 
from the positions they most prefer” (Baum 1997, 90).  
  This observation, however, should not be interpreted to mean that justices do not 
want decisions to reflect, as much as possible, their policy preferences. The best example 
of a justice operating under constrained choices in order to influence a decision in such a 
way as to achieve desired policy outcomes involves an opinion from Justice Brennan. In 
his majority opinion in Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990), Justice Brennan limited the scope 
of Miranda v. Arizona (1966)—a decision he had been a great patron of—by finding that 
physical evidence, such as a videotape showing the defendant slurring his speech upon 
being arrested under suspicion for driving under the influence, was not protected under 
the Fifth Amendment’s provision against self-incrimination. After being heavily 
criticized by Justice Marshall, another proponent of Miranda rights on the Court, Justice 
Brennan explained his unusual behavioral pattern in a private response: 
I made the strategic judgment to concede the existence of 
an exception [to the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination 
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provision] but to use my control over the opinion to define 
the exception as narrowly as possible… If Sandra [Day 
O’Connor] had gotten her hands on this issue, who knows 
what would have been left of Miranda. (Maltzman et al. 
2000, 3-4). 
Because Justice Brennan had been the most senior justice in the majority—Chief Justice 
Rehnquist dissented in part—he was able to assign the opinion to himself, and therefore 
managed to exert unusual influence in a case where he might otherwise have had no 
power. As Maltzman et al. conclude, “Brennan’s actions and correspondence… reveal 
that more than his understanding of legal precedent or his ideology shaped his final vote 
and the opinion he crafted for the Court” (Ibid. 4). 
  Justices also capitulate to pressure from their fellow justices to join an opinion 
because of conformity pressure to join the majority opinion (which presents an image to 
the outside world of a united Court). Vote-shifts can occur in at least three permutations: 
“conformity voting,” wherein an individual votes with the majority at all times; “counter-
conformity voting,” where a justices switches from voting with the majority at the 
conference to voting against the majority when the final opinion is released; and 
“shifting,” where a justice switches coalition groups in response to other justices doing 
the same, resulting in a new majority and/or minority opinion (Wrightsman 2006, 149). 
An analysis by Dorff and Brenner reveals that justices changed their votes from the 
majority block to the minority block 2.2 percent of the time, while shifts from the 
minority to the majority occurred 26.9 percent of the time (Dorff and Brenner 1992, 764). 
Wrightsman suggests that this dichotomy might be attributable to the desire to avoid a 
“minimum winning coalition”—that is, 5-4 decisions. “A minimum winning decision 
fuels the fires of discontent and can damage the Court’s image of authority” (Wrightsman 
2006, 151). Therefore, it is to be expected that justices will be more adaptable to shifts 
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when the vote is close—a finding Brenner supports through his analysis of Justice 
Burton’s private records. According to Brenner, conformity voting was substantially 
more likely to occur when the initial majority from a conference vote was only five or six 
justices. However, when a coalition is larger, the likelihood of additional conformity 
votes decreased dramatically (Brenner 1980, 531). This likely relates to the minimal 
marginal benefit accrued from an additional vote.  
  Since justices are so deliberate in which opinions they join, opinion type is likely 
a large determinant of the presence of the FAE. As discussed in the Legal Model, justices 
want to give the illusion that decisions are based solely upon legal considerations. 
Majority opinions, by requiring more votes than dissenting or concurring opinions, are 
likely less prone to the FAE for this reason. They are also subject to more bargaining, and 
therefore a more rigorous editorial process, which might also dampen non-legal language 
use (i.e. the FAE). Additionally, dissenting and concurring opinions are under less 
scrutiny, since they don’t become law, and therefore justices don’t lose as much political 
capital through employing the FAE in their decisions.  
  The Rational Choice Model is also important for predicting when the FAE might 
arise because it factors in court culture. Chief Justice Burger, for instance, was famous 
for voting strategically to influence decisions that he disagreed with, which led his 
colleagues to adopt similar behavioral patterns (Woodward and Armstrong 1979). Such 
factors can create a culture on the Court that drives certain types of behavior. Court 
culture could easily drive the FAE in opinions, thus the chief justice is included in the 
model (see Methodology) as a control variable.  
  There are likely conscious and subconscious drivers of the FAE in Supreme Court 
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opinions. Intuition possibly dictates the perceptions justices have of parties in cases, and 
this can manifest itself in the form the FAE takes. Similarly, strategic considerations 
might drive the FAE to become more prevalent as justices determine the actions that will 
maximize their utility on the Court. I explore the FAE’s presence from an Attitudinal 
Model perspective, as well as from a Rational Choice Model perspective. This paper 
proceeds by generating hypotheses and testing predictions in order to identify factors that 
likely drive the presence of the FAE in Supreme Court decisions.   
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Chapter 3: Methodology, Predictions, and Summary Statistics 
  This chapter delivers an overview of: the sample population selection process; an 
explanation of why each variable is included in the dataset; and a description of the 
methods used to collect and analyze each variable. Summary descriptive statistics are 
also included and predictions presented. 
  Dataset: In order to generate a dataset comprised of a broad range of cases while 
still controlling for the unique cultural effects that each chief justice brings to the Court 
(Lanier 2011, 684), I generated a list of every case that the Supreme Court heard from the 
start of the 1986 term—the start of the Rehnquist court—through the end of the 2012 
term, (the last term that data is consistently available). In total, the established date range 
included 2,625 cases. I sorted the data first by the term in which the opinion was issued 
rather than heard, as on some occasions cases were heard for several terms before a 
decision was issued (the most notable instance, while not in my dataset, is Roe v. Wade 
(1973), which, due to membership changes on the Court and jurisdictional 
inconsistencies, was heard in the 1970, 1971, and 1972 terms) (Greenhouse 78, 2005). I 
then sorted the cases alphabetically within each term, and assigned each case a unique 
number, between 1 and 2,625. Using a random number generator, I created a list of 26 
numbers with a range of 1 to 2,625 and matched those numbers to 26 of the numbers that 
I had assigned to the cases in the overall dataset. I further delineated the cases in order to 
distinguish each separate opinion (i.e. majority, concurring, dissent) and therefore the 
actual resulting sample size (N=59) is larger than the 26 cases. The number of opinions 
per case ranges from one (found in six cases) to four opinions (found in one case). The 
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average number of opinions per case in the sample is 2.27.** 
  Variables: There are 11 variables in the dataset: situational and dispositional 
references (the two dependent variables); the number of justices who joined (signed onto) 
the opinion; the opinion type (majority, concurring, dissenting); the mean ideology score 
of the authoring justice and the “joiners”; the area of law that the opinion addresses; a 
language-complexity measure (Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score) for each opinion; the 
fatigue of the Court when the opinion was issued; and the chief justice for the term. I 
constructed the two dependent variables in the sample by summing the number of words 
referencing the situation of the party the opinion supports and the number of words in the 
opinion that reference the disposition of the disfavored party. I converted these 
observations into a word-ratio by dividing the total number of words in the situational or 
dispositional references by the total number of words in each opinion. I then multiplied 
the ratio output by 100 so that the numbers could be interpreted as percentages.†† 
  I collected the variable by first obtaining a text copy of all the opinions in the 
sample. There is no centralized and comprehensive website which compiles Supreme 
Court opinions (even the Supreme Court’s website is not all-inclusive), so I relied upon a 
combination of Oyez.com, findlaw.com, and the Cornell Legal Institute (law.cornell.edu). 
I assembled all of the text in one document, and, in order to obtain an accurate word 
                                                
** I recognize that a sample size of 59 observations is rather small. However, the data 
collection process was quite arduous. Data collection for 59 observations required 
reading over 400 pages (single spaced, Times New Roman 12 point font) of raw Supreme 
Court cases. Careful collection of the dependent variable mandated a slow reading speed, 
and it took approximately 60 hours to simply collect and code that particular data. This, 
coupled with the difficulty of determining which justices joined certain opinions (see 
below), resulted in a data collection process that required approximately 120 hours.  
†† I also collected data for references to situations of disfavored parties and to dispositions 
of favored parties. That data is not presented, since it is not within the scope of this 
research question.  
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count, I eliminated brackets that often divide words. For instance, I adjusted language in 
an opinion that read “[T]he State must present” to read “The State must present” so that 
the word count would accurately reflect four words instead of five. Brackets were not 
removed in instances where word count was not affected—e.g. when an entire word was 
bracketed as in “cue [a] dog to alert” or “the facts available to [him].”  
  When counting the words in a dispositional or situational reference, I excluded 
words that were merely referencing statutory language. For instance, in Salazar v. Ramah 
Navajo Chapter (2012), there is a reference which reads “Nothing, for instance, 
prevented the BIA from paying in full respondent Ramah Navajo Chapter’s contract 
support costs rather than other tribes’, whether based on its greater need or simply 
because it sought payment first.” All of these words counted. However, if the reference 
contained a statute, for instance §450j–1(b) (the statute in question in the case), the words 
devoted to the statute were not counted. I also did not count words that merely referenced 
a situation or a disposition of a party in a case but which did not refer to the action in 
question before the Court. In essence, the reference must be a condition of an action. It is 
not enough for a reference to simply assert that “Party A is a good person because they 
have a dog.” Rather, a reference has to either read or strongly imply that “Party A took 
[X action] because they have a dog.” Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion in Salazar v. 
Ramah Navajo Chapter (2012) provides an illustration of a situational reference that 
qualifies for inclusion:  
…the tribal contractors were entitled to rely on the 
Government’s promise to pay because they were not 
“chargeable with knowledge” of the BIA’s administration 
of Congress’s appropriation, “nor [could their] legal rights 
be affected or impaired by its maladministration or by its 
diversion. 
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Similarly, Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. (1999) contains 
a reference to the disposition of the disfavored party’s lawyers (who were essentially the 
party in the case, since their settlement agreement was in question) which illustrates the 
inclusion criteria: 
In this case, certainly, any assumption that plaintiffs’ 
counsel could be of a mind to do their simple best in 
bargaining for the benefit of the settlement class is patently 
at odds with the fact that at least some of the same lawyers 
representing plaintiffs and the class had also negotiated the 
separate settlement of 45,000 pending claims, 90 F. 3d, at 
969-970, 971, the full payment of which was contingent on 
a successful global settlement agreement or the successful 
resolution of the insurance coverage dispute (either by 
litigation or by agreement, as eventually occurred in the 
Trilateral Settlement Agreement). 
While many of the references easy are to code, often the decision whether or not to code 
a sentence as a reference is a judgment call based on the context of the case. Generally, 
the same principle that Justice Potter Stewart applied to pornography in Jacobellis v. 
Ohio (1964) applied during this data collection process: “I know it when I see it.”  
  Table 3.1 provides the mean values for the two dependent variables. The mean 
values are rather low. Situational references for the favored party account for 0.85% of an 
average opinion. The standard deviation for this variable is 1.84%, but the range extends 
from 0% to 9.79%, which is almost five standard deviations away from the mean. This 
range is attributable to Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Lackawanna County District 
Attorney v. Coss (2001), which contains 47 words referencing the situation of the favored 
party in a 480 word opinion. The small word count is likely driving that large discrepancy 
(the number of words in each opinion varies from 78 to 15,991, with a mean of 3,549 
words and a standard deviation of 2,857 words).  
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TABLE 3.1 Summary Statistics for Dependent Variable 
 Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
Percentage of Situational References for 
Favored Party 
0.85% 1.84% 0 9.79% 
Percentage of Dispositional References 
for Disfavored Party 
0.13% 0.40% 0 1.98% 
n = 59 
  References to dispositions of the disfavored party, the other dependent variable of 
interest, has a mean of 0.13%. The standard deviation is 0.4%, which is rather small, and 
the maximum value is 1.98%.  However, the small size of these variables should not 
imply that their effects are unsubstantial. As discussed in the “Chapter 2: Theory”, 
justices are conscious of the fact that they will be criticized for straying from a “Legal 
Model” of judicial methodology. The fact that there are references to situations and 
dispositions at all implies that the desire to include them is rather strong, since otherwise 
the editing process would have eliminated their presence.  
  Finally, it should be noted that in my actual regression analysis I rounded these 
two dependent variables to the nearest percentile so that I could obtain a standard “count” 
variable (i.e. integers) for a Poisson Model. However, I presented the statistics in the 
above summary table to convey a comprehensive overview of the data.   
  Opinion Type: The Supreme Court issues three types of opinions: majority, 
concurrence, and dissent. I created three dummy variables, one for each opinion type. 
Justices who joined in part on majority opinions are counted as having joined. When an 
opinion is listed as 9-0 (as in Knowles v. Mirzayance, 2009) but only some justices are 
listed on the opinion (Thomas, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsberg), all justices are still counted 
as having joined. While coding majority and dissenting opinion type was relatively easy, 
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it proved shockingly difficult to code concurring opinions. This is due to the fact that 
there are actually two different types of concurring opinions: a regular concurring opinion 
(also sometimes known as a “simple concurring opinion”); and a special concurring 
opinion (also sometimes known as “concurring in the judgment of the opinion”). A 
justice utilizes a regular concurring opinion to sign onto a majority opinion, while also 
submitting his or her own separate opinion. A justice issues a special concurring opinion 
when he or she doesn’t want to sign onto a majority opinion (usually because they 
disagree with the legal methodology). Instead, they issue their own opinion that agrees 
with the result but is premised upon a different rationale. The Supreme Court Database 
differentiates between these two concurring opinion types in its publically available data 
and in its codebook. The authors of the Supreme Court Database (political science 
authorities such as Spaeth, Epstein, Ruger, Benesh, Segal, and Martin) presumably have 
project-specific reasons for distinguishing between the two types of concurrences. I 
decided to combine the two types into one general concurring opinion variable. While, on 
the face of it, there is apparently limited difficulty in determining how an opinion should 
be scored, the difference between a special concurrence and a regular concurrence creates 
significant obstacles when attempting to determine which justices joined which opinions. 
This difficulty is further explained in the methodology for the next variable.   
 As reviewed in “Chapter 2: Theory”, the literature suggests that opinion type can 
have a direct effect on opinion content. Concurring opinions are generally issued when 
the author agrees with the legal outcome of a decision but employs a different 
methodology to reach that conclusion. Concurring opinions carry no legal weight, and are 
unlikely to become precedent, but they do: convey a sense of “democratic dialogue” with 
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the public; undermine the legal theory of majority opinion, which can lead to it being 
overruled; and are an officially sanctioned way for justices to defy their voting bloc if 
they do not agree with the majority opinion but agree with the outcome (Collins 2011, 
363). Most importantly, concurring opinions are potentially issued when a justice is 
experiencing cognitive dissonance—when the justice’s desire for a particular legal 
outcome cannot be squared with the justice’s legal approach. Collins finds that “there are 
both strategic and psychological incentives to engage in special opinion authorship when 
casting an attitudinally incongruent vote” (Ibid, 366). In the Collins sample, ideologically 
extreme justices used concurring opinions most frequently, and concurring opinions were 
usually authored alone. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, my sample differs from the Collins 
findings in respect to ideology. Dissenting opinions in my sample tend to be the most 
ideologically extreme (and liberal), while concurring opinions, on average, are 
ideologically moderate. However, my sample does match the Collins study in terms of 
the number of justices that sign onto each opinion type. As can illustrated in Figure 3.2, 
majority opinions include the most authors (naturally; otherwise they wouldn’t be a 
majority) with a mean of 6.92 justices per majority opinion. Dissenting opinions include 
the second-most justices in my sample, with a mean of 2.26 justices per opinion. Finally, 
concurring opinions include the fewest number of justices, with a mean of 1.86 justices 
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indicate that concurring opinions are a tool to deal with the effects of cognitive 
dissonance (Ibid, 371). I believe that it is reasonable to conclude that the likelihood of a 
justice basing their opinion, either verbally or sub silentio, on a non-legal factor could 
potentially be higher in such a situation. The FAE could very well occur in such an 
opinion, particularly when a concurrence is issued for non-legal reasons, and I therefore 
hypothesize that concurring opinions will be positively correlated with the FAE (the 
independent variable).  
    Similarly, dissenting opinions are likely to be vulnerable to the FAE. As 
discussed in “Chapter 2: Theory”, the frequency of emotionally-laden language rises in a 
dissenting opinion, with increased use of italics, “verb modifiers,” and louder punctuation 
compared to other opinion types (Wrightsman 2006, 100). Because dissents actively state 
a counter-claim to a majority opinion, the language used can potentially lead to a rift on 
the Court. Dissents are costly to produce for this reason, and therefore are often issued 
when the justice feels that a gross error is occurring. Dissents are written by fewer 
justices than majority opinions, and therefore require less cooperative effort and are 
subject to a less rigorous editorial process. Therefore, dissenting justices have “the 
rhetorical freedom to take strong, unqualified stands in opposition to the majority” 
(Tetlock et al. 1985, 1,285). Again, I would hypothesize that the nature of dissenting 
opinions would drive a positive correlation between that type of opinion and the presence 
of the FAE.  
Mean Judicial Ideology of the Opinion:  
  I used Martin-Quinn Scores to score each justice’s ideology over each term 
(Martin and Quinn 2002). It is important to use a score that recognizes that judicial 
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ideology shifts over time. The Attitudinal Model of judicial behavior would suggest that 
ideology is static since justices are appointed for life and have little need to change their 
opinions once they are appointed to the Court. This notion is reflected in Segal-Cover 
Scores of judicial ideology, which do not allow for ideological change over time. Martin 
and Quinn (2007) demonstrated that this is an inaccurate representation of judicial 
ideology. Using a Bayesian ideal point model analyzing the opinions of the 18 justices 
who served more than 10 years on the Court between 1937 and 2003, they demonstrated 
that judicial ideology does change over time (Martin and Quinn 2007, 382).‡‡ 
  The collection of the mean ideology variable proved to be extremely challenging. 
The variable is computed by averaging the ideological scores of all the justices involved 
in the opinion. Unfortunately, figuring out just exactly which justices signed onto an 
opinion is not a simple task. Concurring opinions and dissenting opinions explicitly list 
which justices are joining the opinion, but majority opinions do not. On face value this 
shouldn’t present a problem: one could simply add up the justices in the dissents and 
concurrences, and then determine who is involved in the majority opinion. However, 
justices seldom state explicitly if they are issuing a regular concurring opinion or a 
special concurring opinion, and therefore it is nearly impossible to determine who has 
signed onto a majority opinion. One example of this difficulty can be found in Reno v. 
                                                
‡‡ An alternative, non-static score for judicial ideology is the Bailey Ideal Points measure. 
The scores for justices using this methodology are tied to the ideological scores of 
members of Congress and the president for each year. This has the benefit of providing 
context for the ideological score in each year, but the scores are not extensive enough to 
match the sample population that I have drawn (scores run from the 1930s to 2002, which 
is not recent enough). Additionally, Martin-Quinn Scores are extremely effective at 
maintaining a consistent median ideological score for the Court. This prevents the scores 
from being useful for intertemporal comparison, but the scores are perfect for 
determining a consistent effect on an independent variable (which is their purpose in this 
study).  
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American Arab Antidiscrimination Committee (1999). Using the Oyez.com visual 
representation of the “vote” feature on the website (hovering over the photos of a justice 
reveals how he or she voted and the type of opinion, including regular vs. special 
concurrence, that that justice issued), the website suggests that Justice Ginsburg “wrote a 
special concurrence.” This would suggest that she is credited for the concurring opinion 
that she wrote, but is not a joiner of the majority opinion. However, if one relies upon the 
transcript of the audio recording of the opinion announcement (also available on Oyez), it 
quickly becomes apparent that something is amiss: the text reads “Justice Ginsburg has 
filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment which Justice Breyer 
has joined in part.” This would suggest that Justice Ginsburg both concurred in the 
majority decision (at least in part) and concurred in the judgment. This is the opposite of 
what the Oyez website suggests from the visual representation (i.e. that she did not join 
the majority opinion). I decided to score her opinion according to the full transcript of the 
audio Court announcement of the decision.  
  It is also unclear how to score Justice Breyer for this case. In the visual 
representation section, Justice Breyer is noted as “vot[ing] with the majority, join[ing] 
Ginsburg’s concurrence.” But in the audio transcript of the opinion announcement, the 
announcement reads “Justice Ginsburg has filed an opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment which Justice Breyer has joined in part.” The grammar in the 
sentence is difficult to interpret. Did Justice Breyer, like Ginsburg, concur in part with the 
majority and also join her concurrence in judgment? Or did he only join the latter? The 
literal reading of the sentence seems to imply that Breyer only joined in Ginsburg’s 
“concurring in the judgment” opinion. If so, he would not be scored as having joined the 
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majority opinion in part. This is then at odds with the visual representation at Oyez. 
Efforts to cross-check with other sources do not clarify situations such as the two 
described here. For instance, Cornell’s Legal Information Institute offers similarly murky 
presentations of concurrences. Given the difficulty in interpreting the results, I decided to 
utilize the more formal audio transcripts of the opinion announcements available on Oyez 
to make uniform coding decisions on concurrences.  
  Unfortunately, I soon encountered a problem on Oyez where the transcript of the 
audio recording of the decision announcement did not offer full information on 
concurrences and the visual representation section provided more accurate information 
(i.e. the opposite of what I found in Reno). In Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V 
Sky Reefer the visual representation section of Oyez suggested that Justice O’Connor 
wrote a “special concurrence.” However, the audio transcript made no mention of Justice 
O’Connor concurring at all, only mentioning Justice Stevens’ dissent. Relying on the 
standard set forth above (i.e. that audio transcript of the opinion announcement takes 
precedence over conflicting information from other parts of the Oyez site), would result 
in missing some data: that Justice O’Connor issued a special concurrence (which I know 
she did because I read and scored the opinion for the number of words in it). This led me 
to believe that perhaps the best standard for coding this variable would be to use 
whichever part of Oyez provided the most detailed information.  
  I began implementing this methodology. I went back to Reno v. American Arab 
Antidiscrimination Committee (1999) and looked at the actual text of the opinion, which 
is what I had been using to code for situational and dispositional references. I checked the 
language of Ginsburg’s concurrence, which reads “Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice 
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Breyer joins as to Part I, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment” (carrying 
forward the phrasing used during the audio announcement in the decision). This phrasing 
in the master document clarifies the grammar and it becomes clear that Justices Ginsburg 
and Breyer both joined the majority opinion (be it only in part, but in part being enough) 
and issued a concurring opinion.  
  Therefore, relying on the actual text of the opinion would seem to be the best 
method to determine which justices joined opinions. The reader might then wonder why I 
didn’t simply always rely on the original transcript. The short answer is that using the 
master document works for concurrences (with the exception of the infinitely confusing 
Papasan v. Allain (1986), which reads “Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall, 
Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join, concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part”).§§ However, the official text of a majority 
opinion does not list the justices involved in that opinion (the Supreme Court hasn’t 
bothered to standardize their writing process). Therefore, a secondary source is needed to 
confirm that I have included all joining justices to the majority opinion. Oyez’s visual 
representation section as well as Cornell’s Legal Information Institute have therefore 
served as the official sources for compiling the list of justices on a majority opinion, 
while concurring and dissenting opinions are scored using the original text of the opinion.  
  This extensive explanation is included to provide the reader with a sense of the 
magnitude of thought and effort that went into solving this methodological quandary. 
This experience should serve as a cautionary tale for those who rely upon Oyez, a popular 
“multimedia archive devoted to the Supreme Court of the United States and its work” 
                                                
§§ This case was eventually excluded, as I shortened the data range to just Rehnquist and 
Roberts court cases, but it is left in the discussion to provide an example.  
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which “aims to be a complete and authoritative source for all audio recorded in the Court 
since the installation of a recording system in October 1955” 
(http://www.oyez.org/about). I am not the first scholar to encounter such a problem. As 
the Supreme Court Database cautions in its coding suggestions, “determination of how a 
given justice voted is by no means a simple matter of culling the Reports. The justices do 
not always make their [opinions] clear” (Spaeth et al. 2014).  
  Ideology is closely associated with moral conceptions and the use of moral 
language. Conservatives typically identify with “moral strengths” such as independence 
and authority, while liberals typically identify with nurturance of the downtrodden and 
fairness (Lakoff 2002). Political ideology can affect the complexity of a decision in a 
Supreme Court case. Conservative opinions generally rely on less complex notions of the 
world and utilize more absolutist language (Tetlock et al. 1985, 1227). While political 
ideology of the justices writing an opinion and the actual ideological leaning of the 
opinion itself are not perfectly correlated, there is no centralized database of the ideology 
of each opinion that the Court issues (there are measures available for the ideological 
direction of a case available on the Supreme Court Database, but that measure is an 
amalgamation of all the opinions in a case rather than being broken down for each 
individual case). Additional studies also suggest that conservatives are more prone to 
react emotionally to policy issues. Both political and moral conservatism are linked to 
authoritarian tendencies (Feldman and Stenner 1997, 757). Brain structure can also play a 
role in political ideology. “Liberalism [is] associated with increased gray matter volume 
in the anterior cingulate cortex, whereas greater conservatism [is] associated with 
increased volume of the right amygdala” (Kanai et al. 2011, 677). The amygdala is the 
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portion of the brain that controls fear response, while the anterior cingulated cortex 
controls empathy (Ibid. 678). Brain structure also is a highly accurate predictor of an 
individual’s response to conflict monitoring mechanisms, or the ability to overcome 
situations that deviate from the status quo (Amodio et al. 2007, 1246-1247). Given these 
factors, I hypothesize that conservative judicial ideology will be correlated with a greater 
presence of the FAE.  
  Human Case: Coding for the area of law is a straightforward process. I used the 
Supreme Court Database’s code for law issue areas: criminal procedure (1); civil rights 
(2); first amendment (3); due process (4); privacy (5); attorneys (6); unions (7); economic 
activity (8); judicial power (9); federalism (10); interstate relations (11); federal taxation 
(12); miscellaneous (13); private action (14). The data for this variable is freely available 
on the website, and each case is classified with just one variable (e.g. if a case deals with 
both issues of federalism and federal taxation, the authors of the Supreme Court Database 
choose whichever variable is the best fit) (Spaeth 2014). As illustrated in Figure 3.3, 
there are no cases involving issues of due process, attorneys, unions, miscellaneous, and 
private actions. However, there is a heavy concentration of criminal procedure, civil 
rights, judicial power, and economic activity cases. Because my sample size is small, I 
decided to condense this categorical variable into a dummy variable. The dummy 
variable includes two categories: cases that generally deal with “human” subjects, and 
cases which deal with “non-human” subjects. Cases that fall into the criminal procedure, 
civil rights, First Amendment, and privacy “law areas” are coded as “human” cases in 
this new dummy variable.  
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  The literature suggests that some areas of law invoke more emotional responses 
from justices than others  (Martin and Quinn 2007, 367). Justices might also be more 
sensitive to public perceptions of court cases involving civil rights, taxation, and 
federalism, as opposed to cases that center on issues of economics, criminal law, and 
labor issues (Fleming and Wood 1997, 490). I expect that cases dealing with actual 
human parties (i.e. not cases dealing with federalism or federal taxation) will be 
positively correlated with the error’s presence.  
  Language-Complexity Score: This variable is derived using the Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level Score (henceforth simply “FK Score”). An FK Score is a measure of the 
number of years of education an individual needs to be able to comprehend a passage. 
The formula analyzes the number of syllables per word, and the number of words per 
sentence, and regresses those numbers with some constants to produce the FK Score 
(Williamson and Martin 2010, 1824-1825). I pasted the text of each opinion in my 
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Figure 3.3: Frequency of Case Issue Areas
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sample into an online FK scoring machine (https://readability-score.com). The text that 
was used excluded the title description that begins each case (i.e. the header and 
authoring justices). I also removed all brackets that divided a word (i.e. “[T]he State must 
present” became “The State must present”) so that a more accurate FK score could be 
attained.  
  Tetlock et al. argue that “individuals at the simple end of the complexity 
continuum tend to rely on rigid, one-dimensional, evaluative rules in interpreting events, 
and to make decisions on the basis of only a few salient items of information” (1985, 
1,228). While language complexity is not a perfect substitute for conceptual complexity, 
it is a decent proxy that can be used to measure the way cases are perceived by justices. 
The reader might question the wisdom of including such a measure, since seemingly a 
“rigid, one-dimensional” conceptual style might be suited to more conservative thought 
(see section on mean judicial ideology). This was in fact the theory that prevailed in 
political science literature in the 1980s. However, Gruenfeld disproved this notion by 
demonstrating that conceptual complexity is not statistically different between liberal and 
conservative justices (1995, 11). Therefore, there is apparently no risk of 
multicollinearity between the language-complexity score and the mean judicial ideology 
score. In contrast to Gruenfeld, however, it does appear that lower levels of language 
complexity are associated with conservative opinions in my sample. Additionally, liberal 
opinions seem to have a higher level of language complexity. This is presented in Figure 
3.4. I predict, in opposition to Gruenfeld, that language complexity will be negatively 




  Fatigue: Fatigue was measured by counting the number of days between the start 
of the term (always the first Monday of October) and the issuance of an opinion. I did not 
include the day the opinion was issued in the count, since opinions are typically issued in 
the morning, and therefore a full “day” hasn’t passed.  
  There are many accounts of how justices struggle to pay close attention to every 
case that comes before the Court. The Court will hear a little less than 100 cases each 
year, which means that the average case can only be attended to for three days by each 
justice. When considering the fact that the Court takes a three-month break, and the sheer 
mountain of briefs and legal documents that accompany each case, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that justices might suffer from fatigue: the longer the Court is in session, the 
more tired justices become. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, the cases are generally issued 
close to the end of a term, rather than toward the beginning. I predict that fatigue will be 
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Figure 3.4: Language Complexity and Judicial Ideology
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and rushed when deciding cases late on in the term.  
 
  Chief Justice Variable: Controlling for the chief justice has two advantages: it 
allows for some control of temporal factors—for instance, changing cultural norms in 
society—and it recognizes the differing degrees of influence that chief justices have on 
the Court and their colleagues (Lanier 2011, 682-683). Each chief justice is provided with 
a  different variable code: Rehnquist (0); and Roberts (1). Chief Justice Rehnquist 
replaced Chief Justice Burger in 1986, while Chief Justice Roberts attained his current 
position in 2005. There are 43 opinions from the Rehnquist court, and 16 from the 
Roberts court in my sample. I predict that the FAE will not be more prevalent in one 
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Figure 3.5: Timing of Release of Opinions Since Start of Term
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CHAPTER 4: REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
  
Analysis of the variables proved to be challenging, due to the small sample size of the 
dataset (N=59). I began my analysis with a Logit regression to ensure that situational 
references were correlated with the winning party, while dispositional references were 
correlated with the disfavored party. The Logit regression confirmed that this was indeed 
the case, essentially validating the fact that FAE was taking place in the first place. I 
employed a logarithmic Poisson Model to garner a basic picture of the directional 
relationships between the dependent variable (FAE references in opinions) and the 
various independent variables. Utilizing a Poisson Model is the best method to analyze 
this relationship because it allows the dependent variable to remain close to its natural 
state (dependent variable values have to be entered as integers, but the loss of variance 
actually helps with the interpretation of results). In running the Poisson Model (and all 
subsequent models) I used robust standard errors because I assumed that the error term is 
stochastically distributed. The results of this regression are presented in Table 4.1.
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TABLE 4.1, Analysis of Factors Impacting Size of FAE 
Independent Variable Situational References of Favored Party 
Dispositional References of 
Disfavored Party 






Majority Opinion Dummy 16.522*** (1.014) 
15.781*** 
(1.527) 
Dissenting Opinion Dummy 17.100*** (0.406) 
17.039*** 
(0.636) 
Conservative Opinion -0.213* (0.168) 
0.317* 
(0.229) 
Human Case 0.580* (0.506) 
0.498 
(0.673) 
Language Complexity -0.274** (0.155) 
0.246* 
(0.235) 
Fatigue -0.004 (0.005) 
0.030** 
(0.018) 
Court Control Dummy 0.160 (0.619) 
-2.774*** 
(0.874) 
 N = 59, Pseudo R2 = 0.276 N = 59, Pseudo R2 = 0.353 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 (one tailed) 
Cell entries represent Poisson coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
As evidenced in TABLE 4.1, there are a number of variables that are significant when 
regressed against references to the situation of the winning party. Because opinion types 
are dummy variables, I eliminated the least-frequently occurring dummy (concurring 
opinions). Both majority and dissenting opinions are significant. While the coefficients 
cannot be interpreted for their magnitude of effect, their values imply that both majority 
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and dissenting opinions are more prone to the FAE than concurring opinions (the 
excluded category). The ideological mean of the case is also marginally significant in 
explaining situational references to the winning party. The coefficient would suggest that 
more conservative opinions are less prone to applying situational references to the 
winning party than are liberal opinions. Similarly, the case issue area is marginally 
significant, with cases involving “human” issues (e.g. criminal procedure cases) more 
prone to FAE-type language than non-human cases (e.g. federalism cases). Language 
complexity is notably significant, with more complex opinions containing fewer 
references to the favored party’s situation. Fatigue is also marginally significant, 
although, interestingly, it is negatively associated with references to situations of the 
favored party. There are also a number of independent variables that are insignificant in 
explaining the situational references of the winning party. The number of votes an 
opinion receives is insignificant, as is the cultural court control variable.  
  TABLE 4.1 also displays the Poisson Model output for references to the 
dispositions of the disfavored party, the other component of FAE references. Variables 
are generally more significant for this part of the FAE than for situational references. 
Both majority opinions and dissenting opinions contain more references to dispositional 
factors of the disfavored party than do concurring opinions. The ideological mean of an 
opinion is also significant, with conservative opinions positively correlated with 
references to the disposition of the disfavored party (the opposite of the situational 
references for the favored party). Case issue areas dealing with “human” issues are 
marginally significant, and are positively correlated with dispositional references. 
Language complexity is also significant and positively correlated with dispositional 
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references (the opposite effect of the situational regression). Fatigue is statistically 
significant in its correlation with dispositional references, but the coefficient is so small 
that the effect is negligible. Interestingly, the court control variable is statistically 
significant, with Roberts court opinions containing fewer references to dispositions than 
Rehnquist court opinions. Finally, the number of votes an opinion receives is not 
statistically significant, just as it was in the situational regression.   
  Generally the findings were remarkably strong for a regression with such a small 
sample size. In fact, the models and the variables were even more significant before I 
generalized the law issue areas into a simple “human” and “non-human” case area 
dummy variable. Unfortunately, the sample was too small to generate predicted 
probabilities due to the large variance of the dependent variables. In order to 
substantively understand the nature of these independent variables, I tried a different 
model. I collapsed my dependent variable from an interval-level variable down to a 
dummy variable. This change allowed me to explore when the fundamental attribution 
error occurs, but not to what degree. The arduous nature of data collection for the 
dependent variables, unfortunately, required such a switch (see Methodology section for 
estimates of time investment in data preparation and analysis). Dummy dependent 
variables make it possible to run Logit Models and generate predicted probabilities for 
the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable due to the dependent 
variable’s reduced variance.***  
  I used Clarify to develop predicted probabilities for the Logit Model (King et al. 
2000). Predicted probabilities function by generating the mean values for the independent 
                                                
*** I originally attempted to use an Ordered Probit Model, but the variance was still too 
great to generate predicted probabilities.  
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variables in the model. I then changed the pre-set values of a chosen variable to measure 
its effect holding the rest of the model constant to the mean values of the independent 
variables. Independent variables in such a system must be interpreted independent of one 
another; that is to say, the effect of a change in the language complexity of an observation 
should not be combined with the effect of an opinion-type change.  
  Unfortunately, generating predicted probabilities did not lead to the desired 
outcome. The Logit Model, while capable of handling a smaller sample size due to the 
reduced variance, only found drastic effects in its interpretation of the effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. For instance, for a concurring opinion, 
the likelihood of a situational references occurring at all dipped to almost 0%, while a 
majority or dissenting opinion would bring up the likelihood to almost 100%. All 
independent variables had effects approaching 0% or 100% depending on their 
significance, and therefore no concrete understanding of the effects of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable could be generated.  
  Since interpretable predicted probability values could not be generated, I decided 
to use the next-best solution for determining effects: interpreting the Incidence Rate Ratio 
(IRR) of the independent variables. I used the integer-percent breakdowns of situational 
references for the favored party and dispositional references for the disfavored party as 
my dependent variable (as I did with the earlier Poisson Model), and re-ran the Poisson 
Model with robust standard errors while using the model to produce the IRR for the 
independent variables.†††  
                                                
†††   There is a reason IRR interpretation is generally not a favored methodology: it is 
complicated to interpret. A basic Poisson Model generates its coefficients by taking the 
difference in the log of its expected values (since the values of the dependent variable can 
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  TABLE 4.2 portrays the IRR for situational references for a favored party. Three 
variables are insignificant: the number of votes for an opinion, fatigue, and the court 
control variable. There is a large variance in the size of the IRR amongst the significant 
variables, from 0.760 for language complexity to 26,700,000 for a dissenting opinion. 
The large IRRs for majority opinions and dissenting opinions can be explained: FAE 
language is heavily concentrated in those two opinion types, so the likelihood of a “one 
point increase” in the value of these two variables (e.g. changing from a concurring 
opinion to a majority or dissenting opinion) leads to a rate ratio increase by a factor of 
several million percentage points. Obviously this result is erroneous, but the general 
principle still can be gleaned: opinion type has the largest impact on the occurrence of 
situational references, with dissenting opinions containing the greatest likelihood and 
majority opinions following close behind. More conservative opinions are also negatively 
associated with situational references. An IRR score of 0.808 implies that, for every 
increase in an opinion’s mean ideological score (i.e. conservatism), the percentage of 
situational words in the opinion is diminished by a factor of 0.808. The case issue area, 
which is marginally significant, has an IRR of 1.786. Interpretation of a dummy variable 
is straightforward: if a case has a “human” element, the percentage of situational words 
rises by a factor of 1.786, all other variables held equal. Language complexity has a 
                                                
include zero, the actual values cannot be used) (Wooldridge 2012, 546-547). The 
difference between two logs can be written out as a simple division (i.e. “log(ux+1) - 
log(ux)” becomes “log(ux+1/ux)” ), resulting in a ratio of the two logarithmic values 
(Introduction to SAS). IRR is merely the rate of this logarithmic difference, or the result 
of this division. For instance, in Table 4.2 language complexity (fkScore) has a score of 
0.760 for the situational model. This means that, taking the difference between two 
language complexity values, lets say between an opinion with an FK-Score of 10 and 
another one with a score of 11, the opinion with an FK-Score of 11 would be expected to 
have a decreased prevalence of situational references by a factor of 0.760 with all other 
independent variables held constant. 
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negative association with situational references; an IRR of 0.760 means that each 
increase in language complexity reduces the situational-half of the FAE. All of these 
effects, from the (unreasonably) large impact of opinion type to the relatively smaller 
impacts of ideology, case area, and language complexity, have a large effect on a variable 
whose mean value is 0.85% with a standard deviation of 1.84%. These IRR values reveal 
that all significant variables have a substantial impact on the frequency of the FAE.  
TABLE 4.2, Analysis of Factors Impacting Size of FAE 
Independent Variable Situational References of Favored Party 
Dispositional References 
for Disfavored Party 






Majority Opinion Dummy 15,000,000*** (15,200,000) 
7,137,487*** 
(10,900,000) 
Dissenting Opinion Dummy 26,700,000*** (10,800,000) 
25,100,000*** 
(16,000,000) 
Conservative Opinion 0.808* (0.136) 
1.374** 
(0.314) 
Human Case 1.786* (0.905) 
1.646 
(1.109) 
Language Complexity 0.760** (0.118) 
1.279* 
(0.301) 
Fatigue 0.996 (0.005) 
1.031** 
(0.019) 
Court Control Dummy 1.173 (0.727) 
0.062*** 
(0.054) 
 N = 59, Pseudo R2 = 0.276 N = 59, Pseudo R2 = 0.353 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 (one tailed) 




  I ran the same IRR Poisson regression for the dispositional references. These 
results are also catalogued in TABLE 4.2. The number of votes an opinion receives 
remained insignificant, while the case area became insignificant. However, fatigue and 
the court control became highly significant. The variance in the IRR values remained as 
large as in the situational model, with IRR values for a dissenting opinion at 25,100,000 
and for the court control at 0.062. The large values for both majority and dissenting 
opinions, once again, are far too large to be accurate. However, we can still, once again, 
definitively extrapolate: majority and dissenting opinions contain far more references to 
dispositions of parties than concurring opinions. The other variables in the IRR 
regression have reasonable values. Conservatism is now positively associated with 
dispositional references. An opinion with an ideological score of 4, instead of 3, has more 
dispositional references by a factor of 1.374. Interestingly, language complexity is 
associated with dispositional references. An opinion with a Flesch-Kincaid Score of 10 
has higher dispositional references than an opinion with a score of 9 by a factor of 1.279. 
Fatigue is also significant, in contrast to the situational references model, and became 
slightly positively associated with dispositional references. Finally, and most strangely, 
the court control dummy is noteworthy for its significance: the average Rehnquist court 
opinion has fewer dispositional references than a Roberts court opinion by a factor of 
0.062. This difference is quite large.  
  These findings are remarkably strong, particularly in light of the small sample 
size. While a larger sample would have allowed for the construction of predicted 
probabilities, the coefficients and IRRs of the Poisson regression nonetheless provide a 
 50 
roadmap which reveals the relative effects of each independent variable on the dependent 
variable. The original hypotheses include: the FAE fades with increasing numbers of 
votes on an opinion; dissenting opinions are most prone to the FAE and majority opinions 
the least prone; conservative cases utilize more dispositional references, while liberal 
cases employ more situational references; issues of law involving human parties has a 
positive association with the FAE; cases with less complex language are more likely to 
contain FAE language; fatigue causes the FAE to become more prevalent; and the chief 
justice (court control) has no impact on the prevalence of FAE language.  
  Most of these hypotheses are supported. The most surprising results are the high 
prevalence of the FAE in majority opinions and the strong association of the Roberts 
court with dispositional language. The positive correlation between majority opinions and 
FAE language has two possible explanations. The first is a methodological issue. While 
the dependent variable had a built-in control for opinion length,‡‡‡ there is still a potential 
that the increased lengths of such opinions have an exponential effect on the error. It 
could be, for instance, that an opinion of 50 words has, generally, a 0% chance of 
containing the FAE due to its short nature. An opinion of 100 words might have a 2% 
chance of containing FAE language, while an opinion of 200 words—hypothetically—
might have a 10% chance of containing the FAE. Merely dividing the word counts for 
FAE language in an opinion by the length of the opinion cannot control or extinguish 
these exponential effects. The principle is similar to the oft-recounted pop-culture 
legend/theory that, if you let monkeys hit random keys on a typewriter indefinitely, they 
                                                
‡‡‡ The dependent variable was constructed by taking the number of 
situational/dispositional words and dividing them by the total number of words in the 
opinion before multiplying the ratio by 100 to obtain a percentage. 
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will eventually reproduce a manuscript of Shakespeare’s Hamlet.  
  A second explanation for the positive correlation between majority opinions and 
FAE language relates to public perceptions of the Court. As Fleming and Wood (1997, 
490) establish, the Court tends to incorporate public opinion into their decision-making 
process. The Court also attempts to communicate with the public about why it is coming 
to such a decision. It is possible that majority opinion authors, with the knowledge that in 
all likelihood their opinion will be the only one read by the public, try to “simplify” their 
opinions for easier public digestion. A full exploration of these theories extends beyond 
the scope of this paper, but they are useful in considerations of why the majority opinions 
have such a strong correlation with the FAE.§§§  
  At first I imagined that the positive correlation between the Roberts court and 
dispositional references was explained by a conservative ideological shift in composition 
of the justices on the Court from Rehnquist’s tenure to Roberts’. However, this was not 
the case. The Court’s median ideological score in 1986 (the midpoint in the Rehnquist 
court era) was 0.631. This score is greater than in 2009 (the midpoint in the Roberts court 
samples), when the mean ideology was 0.572 (Martin & Quinn 2002). There must be a 
different cultural factor in play—perhaps a justice with a tendency to edit out such 
dispositional references departed when Roberts became chief justice—but I have no 
definitive evidence for such a claim. Clearly, however, some cultural shift allowed for an 
increase in the use of dispositional references.  
                                                
§§§ It is important to remember that majority and dissenting opinions are positively 
correlated with the FAE relative to concurring opinions. The reader might propose a third 
theory: that majority and dissenting opinions have no correlation with the FAE, and that 
rather it is concurring opinions that have a negative correlation. I reject this premise, the 
median case has no FAE language at all, and therefore only a positive correlation can 
explain the presence of the FAE in an opinion.   
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  There are several variables that did not have significant outcomes for at least one 
of the models. Most of these variables had P-values that could, theoretically, become 
significant if the sample size were expanded. The number of votes an opinion receives, 
however, had such large P-values for both models that it seems extremely unlikely that it 
would become significant with a larger sample size. The significance of the variable 
might be driven down by the fact that there are other independent variables that 
essentially control for the number of votes an opinion receives: majority, concurring, and 
dissenting dummy variables. This is a methodological explanation that explains the 
insignificance of the variable. There is also a pragmatic explanation: FAE language may 
be edited out by clerks as opinions are written in order to ensure that opinions are not 
attacked for addressing non-legal concerns. FAE language that survives the edit of four or 
five law clerks for an authoring justice might be able to just as easily survive edits if there 
are 20 clerks working on the opinion. There might be a minimal threshold that, once 
reached, exempts a FAE reference from elimination (i.e. if it survives the edits of one 
clerk, it is almost always left in). This might explain the insignificance of the variable.  
  All other variables behaved as expected. Ideology seemingly dictates whether 
attribution is primarily situational or dispositional. George Lakoff, in Moral Politics 
(2002), argues that conservatives have a tendency to assess issues using a framework that 
focuses on moral strength (inherently a dispositional assessment) while liberals have a 
tendency to look for opportunities to nurture others (which I believe can be inherently 
situational). That’s not to say that conservatives can’t focus on situations and liberals on 
dispositions—after all, part of the error is that we participate in both—but clearly such 
differing moral outlooks have an impact on which half of the FAE justices utilize the 
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most.  
  I also predicted that the issue of law in question in a case would have an impact 
on the presence of the FAE. Martin and Quinn (2007, 367) posited that areas of law that 
deal with what I have termed “human” issues (cases directly involving human parties) 
illicit more emotional responses than cases dealing with “non-humans” (e.g. states). I 
predicted that such emotional responses might manifest themselves in the FAE. 
Generally, this prediction is upheld in this study. Situational references do increase in 
“human issue” cases and, while the variable was not statistically significant, it seems to 
affect dispositional references as well.  
  Language complexity, in the form of Flesch-Kincaid Scores, also is statistically 
significant. I relied on Tetlock et al.’s findings that simple language is correlated with 
individuals who “made decisions on the basis of only a few salient items of information” 
(1985, 1,228). I predicted that individuals focus on situational and dispositional aspects 
of character as two of those salient items, and that the FAE would therefore be associated 
with low language complexity. Increased language complexity was associated, quite 
strongly, with fewer situational references. Interestingly, the opposite was true for 
dispositional references: as language complexity rose, so did the prevalence of that 
component of the FAE. However, subtracting the value of standard error from the values 
of the coefficient and for the IRR bring their values close to zero and below one, 
respectively. This implies that the effect is actually rather small, and therefore the small 
sample size might be playing a role in this unanticipated effect.  
  Finally, fatigue seems to be correlated with increased levels of dispositional 
reference.  This is unsurprising, as justices are often pressed for time toward the end of 
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their terms. The more surprising aspect of the variable is the statistical insignificance of 
fatigue with respect to situational aspects. The small sample size, once again, might 
provide an explanation for this insignificance.  
  These regression results suggest that both conscious and subconscious drivers of 
judicial decision-making are influencing the presence of the FAE. Subconscious drivers, 
such as the manifestation of ideology in moral conceptions of the world, are driving 
liberals to utilize situational references more frequently than conservatives, while the 
inverse is true for dispositional references. Similarly, fatigue, human case issues, and 
language complexity—all subconscious phenomena—have an impact on the frequency of 
FAE references. Conscious decisions, such as the decision to join write join a majority 
opinion rather than a issuing a concurring opinion, also have an impact on the frequency 
of FAE language. Other conscious decisions, such as strategic voting motivated by Court 
culture, have an impact as well.  
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Conclusion 
Justices are prone to the FAE. This is not necessarily surprising, since several models of 
Supreme Court decision-making argue that justices consider factors that are outside of the 
scope of mere statutes. What is surprising is just how many factors in judicial decision-
making are correlated with the presence of FAE language. All variables that were 
controlled for, with the exception of an opinion’s vote total, were statistically significant 
in explaining the frequency of the FAE in an opinion.  
  While a dispositional references rate of 1% might seem harmless, it might 
actually indicate deep-seated bias. As elaborated in “Chapter 2: Theory”, justices are 
wary of being denounced by their peers for employing non-legal rational in their 
decision-making. The fact that there are situational and dispositional references at 
strongly suggests that the FAE is powerful. This can have a profound impact on our 
system of justice which, supposedly, provides a neutral space for the weighing of facts 
without consideration for the likeability of the parties involved. These findings imply that 
justices consciously use strategies that invite the FAE’s presence. Justices also apparently 
fall victim to subconscious biases that make it difficult for justices to possess neutral 
views of the parties in the cases. I’m not going to pretend that I have a solution to the 
problem—I don’t—but these findings suggest that legal advocates need to be aware of 
the impact of extra-legal ideas on justices. Framing the character of your client, 
particularly to emphasize their situation, could potentially present one avenue to greater 
courtroom success for lawyers, albeit at the expense of a judicial system which is 
ostensibly relying only on legal considerations.    
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